Learjet 25

GJV - Sistemas de Seguridad Privada y Mantenimiento

Following an uneventful flight from Cancún, the crew encountered technical problems with the undercarriage while on approach to Toluca-Licenciado Adolfo López Mateos. Decision was taken to complete a belly landing on runway 15/33. The airplane slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest, bursting into flames. All 9 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Aeroquest

The airplane departed Maiquetía-Símon Bolívar Airport at 0011LT for a 35 minutes flight to Barcelona. About five minutes after takeoff, while cruising at an altitude of 23,000 feet, the aircraft went out of control and plunged into the sea few km off Naiguatá, State of Vargas. It appeared the aircraft disintegrated on impact and few debris were found the following morning floating on water. All five occupants were killed.

Aerotransportes Huitzilin

During the takeoff roll on runway 15 at Toluca-Licendiado Adolfo López Mateos, after the airplane passed the V1 speed, the warning light came on in the cockpit panel, informing the crew about the deployment of the reverse on the left engine. According to published procedures, the crew continued the takeoff and shortly after rotation, during initiale climb, the aircraft rolled to the left and crashed in an open field, bursting into flames. The wreckage was found about 200 metres past the runway end. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed.

T-Air - USA

The crew was performing a flight from Texas and the aircraft was carrying a load consisting of six fuel drums according to a Campeche daily newspaper. The Learjet 25D was flying at a very low altitude, maybe in an attempt to land, when it crashed and burned in an open field located in Champotón, some 40 km south of Campeche. Both crew members were killed. Illegal flight suspected.

Starwood Management

The aircraft departed Monterrey-General Mariano Escobido Airport at 0315LT on a flight to Toluca, carrying five passengers and two pilots. Few minutes later, while cruising at 28,700 feet via radial 163, the aircraft went out of control, dove into the ground and crashed in a mountainous area located near Iturbide, in the south part of the Parque Natural Sierra de Arteaga, some 100 km south of Monterrey. Debris were found scattered on an area of approximately 300 metres and all seven occupants were killed, among them the American-Mexican singer Dolores Jenney Rivera, aged 43. She was accompanied with her impresario and members of her team. They left Monterrey after she gave a concert and they should fly to Toluca to take part to a TV show.

Premier Jets

The airplane was flying a VOR/DME-C approach that was on an oblique course about 40 degrees to the runway 30 centerline; the wind conditions produced an 8-knot tailwind for landing on runway 30. Despite the tailwind, the captain elected to land on the 6,600-foot-long runway instead of circling to land with a headwind. Moderate to heavy rain had been falling for the past hour, and the runway was wet. The crew said that the airplane was flown at the prescribed airspeed (Vref) for its weight with the wing flaps fully extended on final approach, and that they touched down just beyond the touchdown zone. The captain said that he extended the wings' spoilers immediately after touchdown. He tested the brakes and noted normal brake pedal pressure. However, during rollout, he noted a lack of deceleration and applied more brake pressure, with no discernible deceleration. The airplane's optional thrust reversers had been previously rendered non-operational by company maintenance personnel and were therefore not functional. The captain stated that he thought about performing a go-around but believed that insufficient runway remained to ensure a safe takeoff. While trying to stop, he did not activate the emergency brakes (which would have bypassed the anti-skid system) because he thought that there was insufficient time, and he was preoccupied with maintaining control of the airplane. He asked the first officer to apply braking with him, and together the crew continued applying brake pedal pressure; however, when the airplane was about 2,000 feet from the runway's end, it was still traveling about 100 knots. As the airplane rolled off the departure end on runway 30, which was wet, both pilots estimated that the airplane was still travelling between 85 and 90 knots. The airplane traveled 618 feet through a rain-soaked grassy runway safety area before encountering a drainage swale that collapsed the nose gear. As the airplane was traversing the soft, wet field, its wheels partially sank into the ground. While decelerating, soil impacted the landing gear wheels and struts where wiring to the antiskid brake system was located. The crew said that there were no indications on any cockpit annunciator light of a system failure or malfunction; however, after the airplane came to a stop they observed that the annunciator light associated with the antiskid system for the No. 2 wheel was illuminated (indicating a system failure). The other three annunciator lights (one for each wheel) were not illuminated. During the approach, the first officer had completed the landing data card by using a company-developed quick reference card. The quick reference card’s chart, which contained some data consistent with the landing charts in the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM), did not have correction factors for tailwind conditions, whereas the charts in the AFM do contain corrective factors for tailwind conditions. The landing data prepared by the first officer indicated that 3,240 feet was required to stop the airplane on a dry runway in zero wind conditions, with a wet correction factor increasing stopping distance to 4,538 feet. The Vref speed was listed as 127 knots for their landing weight of 11,000 pounds, and the first officer’s verbal and written statements noted that they crossed the runway threshold at 125 knots. During the investigation, Bombardier Lear calculated the wet stopping distances with an 8-knot tailwind as 5,110 feet. The touchdown zone for runway 30 is 1,000 feet from the approach end. The crew’s estimate of their touchdown location on the runway is about 1,200 feet from the approach end, yielding a remaining runway of 5,400 feet. On-duty controllers in the tower watched the landing and said that the airplane touched down in front of the tower at a taxiway intersection that is 1,881 feet from the approach end, which would leave about 4,520 feet of runway to stop the airplane. The controllers observed water spraying off the airplane’s main landing gear just after touchdown. Post accident testing indicated that the brake system, including the brake wear, was within limits, with no anomalies found. No evidence of tire failure was noted. The antiskid system was removed from the airplane for functional tests. The control box and the left and right control valves tested within specifications. The four wheel speed sensors met the electrical resistance specification. For units 1, 2 and 3, the output voltages exceeded the minimum specified voltages for each of the listed frequencies. Unit 4 was frozen and could not be rotated and thus could not be tested. Sensors 1 and 2 exceeded the specified 15% maximum to minimum voltage variation limit. Sensor 3 was within the limit and 4 could not be tested. Based on all the evidence, it is likely that the airplane touched down on the water-contaminated runway beyond the touchdown zone, at a point with about 600 feet less remaining runway than the performance charts indicated that the airplane required for the wet conditions. Since a reverted rubber hydroplaning condition typically follows an encounter with dynamic hydroplaning, the reverted rubber signatures on the No. 2 tire indicate that the airplane encountered dynamic hydroplaning shortly after touchdown, and the left main gear wheel speed sensor anomalies allowed the left tires to progress to reverted rubber hydroplaning. This, along with postaccident testing, indicates that the anti-skid system was not performing optimally and, in concert with the hydroplaning conditions, significantly contributed to the lack of deceleration during the braking attempts.

Aero Ermes

On approach to Bahías de Huatulco Airport, the crew was unable to lower the landing gear. It was decided to perform a wheels up landing. The aircraft landed on its belly then slid for few dozen metres, veered off runway and came to rest, bursting into flames. All six occupants escaped uninjured but the aircraft was destroyed by fire. Among the passenger was Ulises Ruiz Ortiz, Governor of the State of Oaxaca.

SK Logistics - SK Jets

About 5 miles from the destination airport, the flight was cleared by air traffic control to descend from its cruise altitude of 5,000 feet for a visual approach. As the first officer reduced engine power, both engines "quit." The captain attempted to restart both engines without success. He then took control of the airplane, and instructed the first officer to contact air traffic control and advise them that the airplane had experienced a "dual flameout." The captain configured the airplane by extending the landing gear and flaps and subsequently landed the airplane on the runway "hard," resulting in substantial damage to the airframe. Both engines were test run following the accident at full and idle power with no anomalies noted. Examination of the airplane revealed that it was equipped with an aftermarket throttle quadrant, and that the power lever locking mechanism pins as well as the throttle quadrant idle stops for both engines were worn. The power lever locking mechanism internal springs for both the left and right power levers were worn and broken. Additionally, it was possible to repeatedly move the left engine's power lever directly into cutoff without first releasing its power lever locking mechanism; however, the right engine's power lever could not be moved to the cut off position without first releasing its associated locking mechanism. The right throttle thrust reverser solenoid installed on the airplane was found to be non-functional, but it is not believed that this component contributed to the accident. No explicit inspection or repair instructions were available for the throttle quadrant assembly. Other than the throttle quadrant issues, no other issues were identified with either the engines or airframe that could be contributed to both engines losing power simultaneously.

Private American

The crew landed with the landing gear in the retracted position. While the airplane was on the base leg of the traffic pattern, the pilot heard a helicopter pilot make a transmission over the common radio frequency. As he completed the before landing checklist the pilot searched for the helicopter that he heard over the radio. During the landing flare he realized something was amiss and looked down at the instrument panel. He noticed that the landing gear lights were illuminated red. Just prior to contacting the runway surface he reached for the landing gear handle and manipulated it in the down position. The airplane made a smooth touchdown with the landing gear in the retracted position. The pilot stated that he did not make the proper check for the gear extension due to the timing of the helicopter distraction. The pilot reported no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane or engine, stating that the accident was the result of pilot error.

Barken International

The airplane collided with a berm following a loss of directional control while landing. The airplane was on a 14 CFR Part 91 positioning flight at the time of the accident. The pilots reported that they encountered what they thought were rough spots on the runway during the takeoff roll. The captain reported that after takeoff, he called for the co-pilot to raise the gear and engage the yaw damper. The crew then noticed an unsafe gear indication for the nose gear. The captain stated they leveled off at 5,000 feet and decreased the airspeed so they could recycled the landing gear. Cycling the landing gear did not resolve the problem. The crew then requested to return to the departure airport for landing. The landing gear was extended and a gear down and locked indication for all three landing gear was observed. The captain stated that on touchdown, the co-pilot extended the spoilers and armed the thrust reversers. He stated that after the nose wheel touched down the airplane made a sharp left turn and traveled off the side of the runway through the grass. The airplane contacted a four-foot high berm prior to coming to a stop on another runway. The captain stated he attempted to taxi the airplane only to discover that they did not have any nose wheel steering. Post accident inspection revealed the seal on the nose gear strut had failed which prevented the nose gear from centering.